



















In recent years Iran has greatly expanded its early childhood education program, taking 
first place in the Middle East in preschool enrolment rates.  In this paper we examine the 
reasons for this unusual expansion and argue that it is in large part an institutional 
response to demographic changes in Iran, notably the sharp fertility decline of the 1990s.  
Fertility declined from more than 6 births per woman in the 1980s to about 2 in 2004, 
while during the same period kindergarten enrollments increased from less than 10 
percent to nearly one half of all 5 year old children.  Economists usually think of the 
effect of the reduction in fertility on demand for child schooling in terms of a trade-off 
between quantity and quality.  In their models fertility decline and rising investment in 
child education are attributed to choices made by families who substitute quality for 
quantity of children.  In the case of Iran, we offer an institutional explanation of the rise 
of pre-school education which complements the demand explanation.  In the early 1990s, 
the decline in primary school enrolments, itself caused by fertility decline a few years 
earlier, gave rise to a surplus of primary school teachers.  In an attempt to preserve 
primary school teachers’ jobs, the Ministry of Education worked together with parents to 
set up kindergarten classes in public schools, even though pre-primary education was not 
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Family life has gone through fundamental change in post-Revolution Iran, especially in 
fertility and child education.  Fertility has declined from more than 6 births per woman in 
the 1980s to about 2 in 2004, while at the same time education, especially for girls, 
expanded to the extent that young men and women born in 1985 now have about 10 years 
of schooling and women outnumber men in universities.  This transformation has brought 
with it not just more investment in formal schooling, but in early childhood education 
(ECE) particularly.  There has been an explosion of interest in books and educational toys 
for children, which can now be found in most homes, but is not easily documented.   
 
This combination of changes has been described in the economics literature on family 
economics as the substitution of quality for quantity of children (Becker 1991), which the 
modern growth theory considers a precondition for long run economic growth (Becker, 
Murphy and Tamura, 1990, Lucas 2002).  In this paper we explore the relationship 
between fertility decline and the increase in education in general and its ECE component 
in particular.  We do not directly address the central question that underlies such a 
relationship, namely whether Iranian families have changed their behavior from the 
traditional high fertility and low investment in child education to low fertility and high 
investment in education.   If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the 
demographic transition in Iran can be viewed in the context of the new economic-
demographic theory of growth, which bodes well for the prospect of Iran’s long run 
growth (Salehi-Isfahani, 2006a and 2006b).   
 
Our aim in this paper is to examine one specific instance of the increase in education in 
Iran--the expansion of kindergarten education—as a case study of this larger question.  
Preschool education is suitable for this purpose in part because it is not part of the 
compulsory education so it reflects parental wishes more closely than other types of 
formal schooling, and in part because of its rapid expansion in recent years.  In 2004-05 
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 about 48 percent of 5 year old children were in a pre-school programs compared to 7 
percent in 1993-94.   Other types of day care services for children below age 5 account 
for about 10 percent of the total pre-primary enrollment, so by focusing on kindergarten 
we capture the most important trend in early childhood education in Iran.  Our findings 
lead us to a mixed conclusion on the extent to which the simultaneous increase in ECE 
and lower fertility are the result of household decisions.  There is a clear sign of a 
demand effect, that is, parental willingness to spend more resources on their children’ 
education.  On the other hand, the specific circumstances that led to the expansion of 
ECE have more to do with an institutional response of the government to the changing 
age structure than a straightforward quality-quantity substitution.  We show that, once the 
effect of fertility decline had shown up in reduced primary enrollments, in its attempt to 
preserve the jobs of the surplus primary teachers, rather unwittingly the government 
undertook the expansion of ECE.  
 
In terms of long term economic growth, ECE investment is of particular interest because 
it is a signal for deepening of human capital.  A significant part of the benefits of smaller 
families for economic growth is realized not by greater formal schooling, which can also 
result from expansion of subsidized public schooling and without any decline in fertility, 
but by greater investment of parental time in child education.  In Iran, as in other Middle 
Eastern countries, the expansion of formal schooling has been more about diplomas than 
accumulation of productive skills.  This is in part because in these countries employers—
often the public sector—reward formal schooling better than productive skills (Salehi-
Isfahani 2006a).  Pre-school education is not required as part of formal schooling in Iran, 
so its rise may be a signal that parents in Iran have not just substituted for child quantity 
by more formal schooling, but are actually willing to invest in productive human capital.  
Even if parents’ interest in pre-school is because it enhances their child’s chances of 
success in formal schooling later, it could still help economic growth because it frees 
women and young girls to participate in formal education and the labor force, and 
promotes the early development of such skills as creativity and teamwork which are not 
taught in grade school (Heckman et al 2004).   
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 The evidence we provide is circumstantial.  We show how the new emphasis in 
kindergarten education is temporally related to changes in age structure resulting from a 
sharp demographic swing in the 1980s.   We also show that the increased supply of pre-
primary education, which at first came in makeshift kindergarten classrooms, was a 
response to a surplus of primary school teachers as primary enrollments tumbled.  The 
program’s popularity since then, however, reflects genuine demand on the part of parents 
for early childhood education and can therefore be construed as quality-quantity 
substitution. 
 
The plan of this paper is as follows.  The next section reviews the literature on the effect 
of ECE on human capital development. Section 3 discusses the effect of fertility 
transition on age structure, school enrollments, and the potential for increase in quality of 
human capital in Iran. Section 4 offers a brief overview of formal schooling in Iran, and 
Section 5 reviews the history of preschool education in Iran and shows how its recent rise 
is related to the changing age structure.  Section 6 is the conclusion. 
 
2. Early childhood development 
Recent research has identified Early Childhood Development (ECD) as an important 
factor in economic and social development (Van Der Gaag & Tan, 1997; Van Der Gaag, 
2002).   Studies have demonstrated that by providing basic health care, adequate 
nutrition, and nurturing and stimulation in a caring environment, ECD interventions 
ensure children’s progress in primary school, continuation through secondary school, 
successful entry into the  work force, and increased future earning capacity (Young, 
2002).   Children who have participated in ECD programs show higher intelligence 
quotients and improvements in practical reasoning, hand and eye coordination, hearing 
and speech, and reading readiness (Myers 1995).
1 By intervening early, ECD programs 
                                                           
1 The 2001 PIRL study examined the effects of preschool education on literacy achievement (Mullis 2002).  
Iran ranked third from the bottom in literacy competency compared to 24 countries, faring better than only 
Argentina and Belize. With only one year of preschool, average achievement on the PIRL literacy score 
increased by 11%, raising Iran’s ranking and placing it on par with Macedonia, Cyprus and Turkey.  
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 allow a leveling of the playing field by enabling all children to fully benefit from school 
and to succeed in the market place, helping to reconcile countries’ goals for equity and 
efficiency (Birdsall, 1999).  Grade repetition and dropout rates are lower, performance at 
school is higher, and the probability that a child will progress to higher levels of 
education increases (Barnett 1995; Grantham- McGregor and others 1997; Karoly et al., 
1998).   Its contribution to social capital has also been documented (Heckman, 2000), as 
well as its effects on reducing delinquent and criminal behavior (Schweinhart et al. 1993; 
Yoshikawa, 1995; Zigler, Taussig, and Black 1992).    
 
Preschool care and education of children aged 3-5 (ECE), which is the focus of this study, 
is an important component of ECD.  Evidence on how preschool can improve access to 
schooling for disadvantaged groups is found in numerous international examples.  An 
evaluation (Barros and Mendoca, 1999) of Brazil conducted by the World Bank and the 
Institute of Applied Economics Research (IPEA) found that one additional year of 
preschool increases the schooling ultimately attained by about half a year, and reduces 
grade repetition by 3-5 percent for each additional year of preschool.  The study also 
found a 2-6 percent increase in future earnings with indications of a higher increase for 
poorer families.  The rate of return on investment costs of preschool education was found 
to be between 12.5 and 15.0 percent.  For children whose parents have 4 years of 
schooling, 1 year of preschool is associated with 0.45 additional years of education.  
Because it is estimated that 1 additional year of education increases potential earnings by 
11 percent, 0.4 years more of education produce an indirect gain of 5 percent in earning 
power.  Children who attend preschool have a direct gain of 2 percent in earning power.  
The combined indirect and direct gains amount to a 7 percent increase in potential 
lifetime income.   Pre-schooling also increases the participation of females in the labor 
force.  Studies in Brazil, Mexico, and Guatemala found that access to childcare frees 
older siblings, usually girls, to return to school to complete their own education or to go 
to work.
2
                                                           
2 Brazil Early Child Development, 2001. World Bank, Human Development Department,  Report No. 
22841-BR.  
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 3. Demographic swings and Early Childhood Education in 
Iran 
In this section we consider the role of a large demographic shift in the last two decades on 
the rise of ECE in Iran.  We show that the rise of ECE is part of the demographic 
dividend which is also responsible for the overall increase in education.  In our view 
neither would have been possible without the significant reduction in fertility that started 
in the mid 1980s (Figure 3).  The decline of fertility by one-third in a period of about 15 
years, if not itself motivated by the desire to invest more in children, has certainly made it 
possible for parents to spend more resources on each child’s education.  These resources 
were made available primarily because of changes in age structure, which have 
significantly increased the number of adults per child in Iran.   
 
The swing in age structure in Iran has been more exaggerated because fertility rose before 
falling precipitously.  In the early years of the revolution, total fertility (average number 
of births per woman) rose from about 6 to 7, before falling to about 2 in 2004 (Figure 3).  
The peculiarity of Iran’s fertility transition is demonstrated in Figure 3 which compares 
the pattern of decline in total fertility (TFR) and child (under 5) mortality rates (CMR) for 
the three largest countries of the Middle East.  Whereas in Egypt and Turkey we observe 
a relatively smooth transition, and where decline TFR closely follows decline in CMR, in 
Iran fertility rises before falling and with a substantial delay.   This rise and fall in fertility 
helps explain the drastic changes in age structure in Iran that we believe help explain the 
sharp rise in ECE (see Figure 6 and Section 5 below). 
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Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2005. 
 
The post revolution baby boom quickly resulted in a sharp increase in the number of 
primary age children.  The number of primary school age children accelerated after 1980 
(indicated in Figure 4 by the number of 5-9 year olds, assuming 100% enrollment), rising 
by 60 percent between 1980-90, forcing public schools to use their buildings in two and 
sometimes even three shifts per day.  This was indeed the initial reason why the 
government reversed its position on family planning and launched its integrated health 
and family planning program in 1989.  The programs success soon alleviated the intense 
pressure on the education system.  Since 1990 the number of 5-9 year olds (and by 
implication primary enrollment) has fallen by one-third.  As we show below, the savings 
from this decline in the primary age population is the key to the increase in preschool 
enrollment. 
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It took only a few years after the government initiated the family planning program in 
1989 for its benefits to show up in enrollment data. The number of children enrolled in 
primary school dropped by nearly 4 million, from 9.9 million in 1993-94 to 6.2 million in 
2004-05.  By the year 2010, the population of primary school students is expected to 
decrease by another 1 million, freeing up additional teachers and educational resources 
(Figure 5).   
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Source: Ministry of Education, Tehran. 
 
 
The effect of the sharp decline in fertility on age structure is depicted in Figure 6, which 
shows the historic values of the adult-child ratio since 1956 and its projected values until 
2016 using the United Nations population forecasts.  The number of adults (20-54 year 
olds) per child (0-14) has been on the rise since mid 1990s, doubling the ratio in the last 
ten years in both rural and urban areas.  If fertility declines according to the optimistic 
UN scenario, it may reach as high as 3 by the year 2030 (Salehi-Isfahani 2005). 
  
The rising adult child ratio is a once-and-for-all opportunity for investment in human 
capital, known in the development literature as the demographic window of opportunity 
(Barlow 1994, Salehi-Isfahani 2002).  The adults in the numerator are parents who, since 
the late 1990s, have no longer been outnumbered by their children, and therefore can 
provide them with better health and nutrition and prepare them better for school.  They 
are also teachers who would teach fewer students per class.  The fact that the number of 
adults per child in urban Iran in 2005 was twice what it was in the mid 1990s (see Figure 
6) show how dramatically the ability of Iranian families has improved in educating their 
children in the last ten years.  This increase in the societal “teacher-pupil” ratio bodes 
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 well for education of the next generation, especially since new mothers—women aged 
20-29—have on average about ten years of schooling (see Table 1 below).  The increase 
in years of schooling and the narrowing of the education gap between boys and girls 
discussed in the next section is how Iran is taking advantage of its demographic window 
of opportunity.  In this context the rise of early childhood education is interesting because 
it reveal a new dimension of the response of families to the changing demographic 

































































Note: The ratio of adults
Source: United Nations, culations. 
 
4. Expansion of formal schooling  
The rise of formal schooling in Iran is probably the most important socio-economic 
change in Iran in the last three decades, especially because it entailed a narrowing of the 
education gap between men and women (Table 1).
3  The cohorts born right after the 
Revolution, in 1980-84, have achieved as adults on average about 8 year of education in 
rural areas and 11 in urban areas, compared to the 1940s cohorts with less than one year 
in rural and 4 years in urban areas.  The narrowing of the gender gap has been also 
                                                          
 20-54 years old to children 0-14. 
 World Population Prospects 2002 and author’s cal
 
3 For education of women in Iran, see Mehran (1997 and 1999). 
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 impressive.  Women born during 1940-49 had only a fraction of schooling of men in rural 
ed to 
bout 10% in rural areas and zero in urban areas.  The younger cohorts of Iranians born 
sinc  (in urban areas about 11 years 
areas and about half in urban areas.  For the 1980-84 cohorts the gap has narrow
a
e 1970 have on average at least a basic education
which since 1996 is a high school diploma).  The socio-economic effects of this 
education increase will last into the future as these are the parents in charge of educating 
the next generation of Iranians. 
 
Table 1: Educational attainment by gender and cohort (average years of schooling) 
 Rural  Urban 
Cohort Male  Female  Total Male  Female  Total 
1940-49  1.40 0.10 0.70 5.80 2.80 
1950-59  3.20 0.70 1.90 7.70 5.10 6.40
1960-64  4.90 1.70 3.30 8.80 6.50 7.70
1965-69  5.50 2.80 4.10 9.10 7.50 8.
1970-74  6.80 4.20 5.40 9.50 8.40 8.90
1975-79 8.00  5.90 6.90 10.10 10.10  10.10




Source: Authors’ calculations based on unit record data from Household Expenditure and Income
2002. 
 
The expansion of education is al
 Survey, 
so reflected in enrollment rates in Table 2.  Enrolment 
tios in basic primary education are now comparable to countries at similar levels of 
 78.5 
p n 1988 .4 pe 002.  apid ris rollm come at a cost.  
As class sizes increased in the 1980s and man e even 
three—shifts, education quality suffered. 
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economic development.  The intake for primary education has increased from
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 Table 2: Enrollment rates by gender and level of education, 1995-2002 
  Primary  Lower secondary  Upper secondary 
Year Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total Boys Girls Total 
1995  108.6 101.4 105.1 100.1 81.6 93.1 72.7 66.7 69
1998  108.9 102.9 106.0 102.2 85.1 95.9 79.9 81.2 80
1999  107.7 102.4 105.1 102.6
2000  107.2 102.2 104.8 102.6 
.8 
.5 
 85.0 96.0 78.0 81.5 79.7 
85.0 96.1 77.1 81.7 79.3 
001  103.7 99.5  101.6 102.8 85.9 96.6 77.9 83.8 80.8 
2002  101.8 98.1  100.0 103.6 87.5 97.8 76.6 82.6 79.5 
2
Note: Enrollment rates for later years are sensitive to population estimates for the relevant age groups. 
Source: Ministry of Education, Tehran, Iran. 
 
5. The history of pre-schooling in Iran 
Preschool education in Iran dates back to the early years of the twentieth century,
4 but it 
accelerated only recently.  The first preschools were set up by Christian missionaries in 
Iran in 1919, which were mostly attended by children from the rich families.  In 1924, 
recognizing the growing importance of pre-school education, the government prepared 
and ratified the bill to regulate their operations and conferred the first permit to operate a 
kindergarten in Tehran in 1931.    During 1943-53 the government set up centers for 
training of preschool teachers and enrollments increased from 1,874 to 5,346.  In 1961 
the government started to operate its own kindergartens to allow children from middle 
and lower income classes to attend preschool, but these were mostly set up within its own 
ministries to help women employees.  By 1972, there were 431 such centers.  In 1974 the 
age for attending preschool was raised from 3 to 5.  There was a surge of demand in day 
care and pre-school education during the oil boom years of 1973-78 before the 
Revolution (Figure 7), which was met mostly by day care centers attached to places of 
employment of women.  As a consequence, as some women left the labor force or were 
encouraged to retire early after the Revolution, many of these centers were closed down 
and enrollments fell by one quarter.  A further decline in primary school enrollments 
occurred in the mid 1980s following the huge increase in primary school age population, 
which created a shortage of primary teachers and reduced the supply of preschool 
education.  In 1984 enrollments reached their lowest level of about 78,000, less than one-
                                                           
4 For the early history of preschool education in Iran see Encyclopedia Iranica, “Nursery and pre-school 
education,” http://www.iranica.com/newsite/, under Education. 
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 third its previous high of about 260,000 (see Table A.1 in Appendix).  With the end of the 
 19 l s pi p,   i .
5  
 7. lm  pre ls 
war in 88, enro lment cked u only to fa in ll aga n 1992
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Notes: 1968 refers to school year 1968-69, and preschool refers to children age 5.   
Source: Ministry of Education 2005 (see also Table A.1). 
                                                           
5 The time series of preschool enrollments depicted in Figure 7 is problematic because for earlier ye
before 1966, the age range is 3-6, some of whom are in day care but in later years it is only the 5 year old 
children in kindergarten (see “Nursery and kindergarten education,” Encyclopedia Iranica).  To get a sense 
ars, 
of the proportions involved, consider the numbers for 2003-04 (which do separate day care and 
kindergarten):  492,422 kindergarten (5 year-old) children, compared to 51,385 in the 0-4 category who 
 day care is not available for all years. 
were in nursery and day care, the latter comprising only about 10 percent of all pre-primary care of any 
type.  Unfortunately, data on growth of the number of children in
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 Table 3: Preschool Enrollments, 1993-2004 
Year Enrolment  Ratio Boys Girls  Total
1993-94 7.6 69,119 63,534  132,653
 1994-95  8.2 73,946 67,782  141,728
1995-96  86,948  181,591
1996-97  95,339  195,181
1997-98 15.5 104,014 100,308  204,322
1998-99 16.3 110,711 109,723  220,434
1999-00 22.0 125,700 125,856  251,556
2000-01 25.3 142,538 144,365  286,903
2001-02 29.2 160,822 168,240  329,062
2002-03 35.6 195,536 208,176  403,712
2003-04 39.8 212276 226503  438779
2004-05 47.8 238387 254035  492422
11.0 94,643
14.3 99,842
Source: Enrolment is Ministry of Education (MOE), population estimates are based on birth registration 
data from Civil Registration Office (CRO), and under 5 mortality rate of 3.5 percent estimated the 
Statistical Center of Iran (SCI). 
 
Since 1993, expansion of kindergarten education has increased uninterrupted and at a 
rapid pace (Figure 7 and Table 3).  In 2004-05, 47.8 percent of 5 year olds attended 
6 of kindergart ns 
 in 2004-05.  Nearly 4000 of these were 
added in that year, while the number of primary schools decreased by about 1500.   
 
Will this latest expansion of preschool education continue or stall, as it has in the past?   
To answer this question we must first understand how the latest phase of expansion came 
about.  Was it part of the general government-led expansion of formal schooling, or was 
it an indication of increasing demand on the part of parents for deepening of formal 
education by extending it to ECE?  The answer appears not to be the first because in Iran 
ECE is not part of the government’s mandate as yet.   Because of this fact, as we show 
below, the Ministry of Education took the responsibility for expansion of ECE rather 
unwillingly.  The evidence we present suggests rather that ECE growth was related to 
kindergarten, compared to only 7.6 percent in 1993-94.   The number  e
increased from a few hundred in 1970s to 17,291
                                                           
6 Preschool enrollment rates are sensitive to population estimates, which are not available from the same official sourc
in Iran.  MOE estimates for enrolment rates are lower than ours after 1996, because estimates of the 5 year old 




are derived from the same CRO birth 
registration data using published SCI under 5 mortality rates.  For example, the MOE estimate for the number of 5 y
olds in 2004 exceeds the number of births five years earlier (in 1999) by more than 8 percent, which only makes sens
if one assumes undercounting of births by about 13 percent.  There is no evidence that CRO data underestimate the 
number of births at this rate. 
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 increased demand by parents but specific institutional reasons were instrumental in 
mak ppen. re-school ed  is directly  to the dec
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the e as when it decid  have few n, there i n to belie
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gov , as a passive actor  to wait u e baby bo en had m
through the entire system of fo  schooling t could thi hing in on
e 
 relief from a fast growing population was years away, until 
t 
 
overnments who must decide whether to respond to a decline in fertility (and hence 
ue in 
g 
of employees was considered a heartless capitalist act.   
ing it ha   We argue that p ucation  related line in 
er o ge child  4).  As rlier, in 
 1990s th imary en, and ary enr , 
lined rap ily that m st more in ld at 
 same tim es to er childre s no reaso ve that 
t.   In fact, the 
ernment , had ntil all th om childr oved 
rmal  before i nk of cas  the 
demographic gift.  In the 1990s, even as primary enrollments were declining, as far as th
government was concerned
the fertility bulge had passed through lower and upper secondary schools as well.   
 
Since Becker’s (1960) seminal work, economists have viewed increases in education tha
follow closely fertility reduction as quality-quantity substitution.  However, in developing
countries where most education is publicly provided, such substitution involves 
g
enrollments) by raising quality or spend the savings elsewhere.  There are competing 
demands for government revenues outside of the education sector, so reduction in 
enrollment can as easily result in a smaller education budget as in reduced class size and 
higher quality.   The institutional responses to fertility decline in Iran was fairly uniq
that it brought about higher quality in the form of ECE but it was an unintended 
consequence of an unwillingness or inability to either layoff unwanted primary school 
teachers or retrain them for middle school teaching.  This was itself very much a 
consequence of the revolutionary spirit that still prevailed in the 1990s Iran, where firin
 
The response of Iran’s Ministry of Education to primary enrollment decline was thus 
shaped by institutional constraints and political expediency.  The institutional constraint 
was a government directive, attached to the Second Five Year Development Plan (1989-
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 93), which prohibited the government from shifting its more important resource—
manpower—up to higher grades (presumably because the planners considered retraining 
impractical).  This tied the Ministry’s hand in reassigning the surplus primary school 
teachers who could have, albeit with less competence, filled in the needed slots in th
expanding lower secondary level schools.  Political expediency for a revolutionary 
government with a strong anti-capitalist rhetoric, equally ruled out the alternative of 
laying off the surplus primary school teachers.  As a result, the only real choice
government were to lower primary class sizes and to employ the surplus teachers to 
expand pre-school education.  Both would raise education quality, though in different 
ways.   In the event, the government did some of both; it lowered class size at primary 
level and expanded kindergarten education.  Pupil-teacher ratios at primary level fell 
from a peak of 31 in 1991 to 20 in 2004, and education expenditures per primary stu
e 
s for the 
dent 






classroom space and collected 
ition from parents, thus creating semi-public kindergartens that would flourish in the 
ool 
n
2001 and 2005).  Increased resources at the primary level also resulted in improved 
efficiency as transition rates from primary to lower secondary level increased from 83 
percent in 1993 to 96 percent in 2002 (MOE 2005). 
 
Shifting excess resources down to pre-primary education was not straightforward beca
yet another institutional constraint prevented the Ministry of Education from engag
delivery of kindergarten education.  As noted earlier, preschool education was (and still 
is) not part of the Ministry’s mandate, so the government could not pay for teacher 
salaries and other expenses out of the Ministry’s annual budget.  So, funds to pay
preschool teachers and school supplies had to be raised from parents.  The government’
role went beyond a middleman between parents and teachers, as it provided the m
important ingredient for their joint enterprise—classroom space—free of charge.  In 
every school with surplus faculty, school officials set up 
tu
following years.  The government had achieved its main objective to help primary sch
teachers keep their jobs, and in the process has promoted ECE. 
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 This innovative approach of the Ministry to balancing supply and demand for prim
teachers led to a sharp increase in preschool enrollments as noted earlier, from 7.6% in 
1993-94 to 47.8% in 2004-05, rising at an annual rate of 12.6 percent (Table 3).  The r
of pre-primary education has not only improved primary education in terms of higher 
efficiency as noted above, it has put Iran in a favourable position internationally.   T
latest UNESCO (2006) report which provides comparative cross country data for 200
shows Iran’s gross preschool enrolments at 30.7 percent, much higher than the average o
Arab countries (17.7 percent), but below Countries in Transition (34.6 percent), 
Developing Countries (34.3 percent), and Developed Countries (81.1 percent).   The 
government plans to enroll 70 percent of preschool children by 2010, which is a realisti
goal because the number of preschools children is expected to remain relatively consta
in the near future. 
 
The positive institutional response to falling fertility is obviously only half of the sto
rising child quality in Iran.  The other half is the demand side, or more precisely the 









ldren in government sponsored pre-








on such as ECE.   
s
their lower demand for children.  In other words, parents, for reasons we can discuss, has 
shifted their behavior from the traditional high fertility-low education to low fertility-high
education sometime in the 1980s, and thus they were interested in enrolling their children
in pre-school.  They were posed for greater investment in them when the government 
found a way for them to do so.  As a related development, at about the same time 
awareness of the importance of early childhood development was increasing.   Discussion
of child psychology in the public media, notably in widely circulated Hamshahri daily
and in state television, grew in the 1990s and helped parents become more aware of th
benefits of early childhood education.   This was critical in channeling the new energy fo
child education released by lower fertility away from pressure for better grades and test
scores at high school and the university entrance examinations (which are still big 
obsessions of Iranian parents) to less tangible aspects of educati
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 Second, more women entered the labor force in the 1990s, increasing the demand for 
daycare and kindergarten services.  Figure 8 shows the rise in the participation in marke




rket (see World Bank 2004), but, as noted above, have higher demand 
r pre-school education.   
7   The participation rates for both 
rural and urban increased for all ages.  Rural women’s participate rate is greater but 
because of the nature of their work are in a better position to combine work and child 
care.  The group most affected by lack of day care is probably urban women aged 25-34 
and married, the group most likely to have children under 6.  Participation rates for these 
women were still under 20 percent in 2001 but had been increasing in the previou
decade and a half.   The low activity rate of Iranian women compared with high dema
for pr-school education is interesting in itself and an indication of the importance of the 
demand factor in the case of Iran.  Compared to women in North Africa, Iranian women 
work less in the ma
fo





























15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54
Source:  SECH 1987, 1992, 2001
by age group
Labor force participation of married women
1987 1992 2001





e data are from three rounds of the survey Social and Economic Household Characteristics (SECH), 
onducted by the Statistical Center of Iran.  See also Salehi-Isfahani (2005). 
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 Public vs. private supply of preschool education 
If demand for preschool education were high, why did the private sector not step in to 
satisfy it?  Although nearly all schools in Iran are public, since preschool education was 
not part of the government’s mandate it would have made sense for the private secto
fill in the gap between supply and demand.  In 2004-05, of 218,149 schools at all levels 
of schooling only 12,778, or 6 percent, were private.  Nearly all educational institutions 
in rural areas are public.  Overall, private sector has played a slightly stronger role at the 
kindergarten level than grade school (see Table 4), but its share in the provision of 
kindergarten education has fluctuated.  In the 1990s the private sector increased its share 
in kindergarten education from 12.0 percent in 1993 to 19.5 percent in 1997, but its share
fell below 10 percent in 2001 as the number of public schools offering preschool 
expanded.   During 1993-2002 enrollments in public kindergartens increased by a factor 
of 4 compared to 2.5 for pri
r to 
 
vate institutions.   However, since 2003 enrollments in private 
kindergart  21 
percent compared to 11 for public.   Evidently, for most of this period, the pressure from 
demand was not sufficient to induce private sector investment in kindergartens, but 
perhaps that is about to change. 
 
Table 4. The distribution of kindergarten schools and students by ownership 
 Schools  Students 
ens has been increasing faster; in 2004 private enrollment increased by
Year Public  Private  Total  %  private Public  Private Total  %  private 
1993 5,292  285  5,577 5.11 116,336 16,317 132,653  12.30
1994 5,592  499  5,877 8.49 117,871 23,857 141,728  16.83
1995 2,201  808  3,009 26.85 147,064 34,527 181,591  19.01
1996 2,400  922  3,322 27.75 157,711 37,470 195,181  19.20
1997 2,462  988  3,450 28.64 164,498 39,824 204,322  19.49
1998 3,285  958  4,243 22.58 185,891 34,543 220,434  15.67
1999 4,812  996  5,808 17.15 219,700 31,856 251,556  12.66
2000 6,331  1,051  7,382 14.24 257,354 29,549 286,903 10.30
2001 8,477  1,104  9,581 11.52 302,074 26,988 329,062 8.20
2002 11,174  1,286  12,460 10.32 372,852 30,860 403,712 7.64
2003 12,099  1,398  13,497 10.36 404,064 34,715 438,779 7.91
2004 15,719  1,572  17,291 9.09 450,351 42,071 492,422 8.54
Source: Ministry of Education (2005).  
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 6. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the rapid expansion of pre-primary education in the last ten 
years in Iran in the context of Iran’s demographic transition.  We argued that the rise in 
ECE, indicated by increase in preschool enrollment from 8 percent in 1993 to about 50 
percent of the 5 year old population in 2005, is related to the rise and fall of fertility in 
post-Revolution Iran.  We examined the extent to which the fall in fertility and rise in 
education in the 1990s can be viewed as the substitution of quality for quantity of 
children, an idea which forms the cornerstone of the new theories of economic grow
proposed by Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) and Lucas (2002).    We showed that in 
the case of ECE in Iran, the basic elements of the quality-quantity substitution are 
present, but that the story was more complicated, and perhaps even more interestin
the theory based entirely on individual choice would have us believe.    
 
The mechanics of how resources freed as a result of lower fertility found their way in
greater investment in ECE goes well beyond what a simple model of household decision 
making would suggest, namely parental decisions to substitute quality for quantity o





ary school age children dropped and a surplus of 
rimary school teachers developed, political expediency of the revolutionary government 
overnment 
d e ru  r in  to teach at higher levels.  The government
left with the options to  l  ig s tea
t  kind n.  S  pr ol was r a h ment
not able to directly pay these teachers, so it in an innovative fashion it acted as 
i parent d i c ation
T itch i y  r  t be pr  u d t  to t
i iona t i   s oper In la e
M y of on  as the intermed e im h ers in 
o have the resources and the will to invest in their 
p
constrained it from laying off thousands of primary school teacher a g s, while 
irectiv led out e-assign g them  was then 
reduce class size at the primary leve or reass n surplu chers 
o teach ergarte ince escho  not pa t of its m ndate, t e govern  was 
ntermediaries between teachers and  s in or er to prov de pres hool educ .   
he sw n famil behavio canno operly nderstoo  withou  reference he 
nstitut l contex n which familie ated.     particu r, the d cision of the 
inistr  Educati  to act iary b tween pr ary sc ool teach
search of a job and the parents wh
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r areas than 












and its labor market too rigid to induce individuals to invest in the variety of skills that 
modern economic growth requires.  As a result, Iran’s formal schooling will probably 
Iran.   
 
The analysis of this paper draws attention to a simple fact that social outcomes depend o
the institutional context in which individuals operate, which is often overlooked when w
try to explain such outcomes by relying on models of individual behavior alone.  Whet
or not demographic transitions go hand in hand with greater investment in human c
depend to a large extent on the institutional or policy context of the country.  The lesson
for other countries of how Iran’s demographic dividend gave rise to higher preschool 
enrollments is that the benefits of fertility decline do not automatically lead to grea
investment in child education.  After all, governments in developing countries have other 
urgent uses for the freed resources and may decide to spend them in othe
e
 
There is also a lesson for Iran’s own future benefits from fertility decline.  The potential f
greater investment in education exists for another decade or two as the fruits of lower f
are realized in terms of a rising ratio of adults to children.   The number students at 
level will stabilize at about 6 million, but it will fall for lower secondary from 4.4 to 3.7 
million and for upper secondary from 4.2 to 4.1 million.  The demographic gift will contin
to present the families and the government of Iran with the opportunity for further 
improvements in the quality of education.  But, the country also faces a great challenge to
provide jobs for nearly a million young adults who enter the labor market every year.   In
end, Iran’s decision to use its demographic dividend to increase enrollments at p
level, whether the result of household calculations or institutional happenstance, was 
fortuitous.  But the institutional constraints that may prevent further gains in human cap
deepening are quite formidable.  As Salehi-Isfahani (2002, 2005) has argued, the e
institutions of education and the labor market in Iran do not provide the right incentiv
effective utilization of the demographic gift.   Iran’s educational system is too compe
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 continue to expand, while the stock of its effective human capital stagnates.  The preva
incentiv
iling 
es push parents and students into greater focus on test taking and rote memorization 
t the expense of valuable skills that test results fail to reveal.  To end on an optimistic note, 
d 
a
no matter what happens with future investments in human capital, the rise of early childhoo
education will prove a lasting improvement because, by its nature, it promotes a variety of 
types of skills.  
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1943 966  1874  51.55   30
1953 1730 5344  32.37   115
63 5924  13296  44.55   262 19
1968 8782  19462  45.12   337
1969 9248  20214  45.75   376
1970 8706  19308  45.09   349
1971 9509  21237  44.78   431
1972 10025 21773  46.04   419
1973 18587 40987  45.35   607
1974 40574 82854  48.97   980
1975 79978  175424  45.59   1804
1976 97434  211869  45.99   2342
1977 108298 235136  46.06   2918
1978 119662 259497  46.11   3492
1979 109123 236486  46.14   3696
1980 81163  172003  47.19   2791
1981 92554  195989  47.22   2737
1982 85329  177525  48.07   2410
1983 100960 202899  49.76   2735
1984 36135 77774  46.46   1276
1985 50376  106986  47.09   1732
1986 58451  123437  47.35   1911
1987 69064  146409  47.17   2162
1988 85223  177979  47.88   2547
1989 103345 217496  47.52   3210
1990 108151 227492  47.54   3586
1991 119959 252513  47.51   4114
1992 81307  168864  48.15   3003
1993 63534  132653  47.89   2483
1994 97782  141728  68.99   2715
1995 71299  147064  48.48   2201
1996 95339  195181  48.85 1361581 3322
1997 100308 204322  49.09 1318616 3450
1998 109723 220434  49.78 1355445 4243
1999 125856 251556  50.03 1145103 5808
2000 144365 286903  50.32 1134447 7382
2001 168240 329062  51.13 1126193 9581
2002 208167 403654  51.57 1133259 12456
2003 226503 438779  51.62 1103822 13497
2004 254035 492422  51.59 1029455  
Notes: 1943 refers to school year 1943-44.   
Source: Ministry of Education (2005) 
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